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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the 
STATE OF UTAH 
JOSEPH PINTAR, ' 
Plaintiff-Appellant, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMIS- Case No. 
SION OF UTAH AND COLUM- 9864 
BIA GENEVA STEEL DIVI-
S I 0 N, UN I T E D STATES 
STEEL CORPORATION, 
Defendants-Respondents. 
RESPONDENTS' BRIEF 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
With the exceptions hereinafter set forth, respond-
ents agree generally with the statement of facts in 
appellant's brief. 
The description of the nature and extent of injury 
to Pintar and the statement that he was no longer able 
to work after October 2, 1961 are not accurate but set 
fo:rftthe contention of Pintar rather than facts shown 
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by the record. The statements based upon the report 
of Dr. Burke M. Snow are not statements of fact. Dr. 
Snow's services for the examination of Pintar were not 
obtained by respondents. His examination was made 
at the request of Pintar as shown by his report dated 
October 17, 1961 addressed "To Whom It May Con-
cern''. (R. 1-4). ::Jir. Snow did not testify at the hearing 
held September 4, 1962 which was the only hearing held. 
(R. 30-40). 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
The conclusion of the Industrial Commission that 
there was no causal connection bet'lveen the injuries of 
March 29, 1961 and July 25, 1961 and any disability 
now existing is not directly contrary to the evidence and 
is not erroneous as a matter of law. 
There is no substantial evidence that Pintar has 
any disability resulting from his injuries of March 29, 
1961 and July 25, 1961. The Medical Panel Report 
dated February 5, 1962 does not so disclose. (R. 25-27). 
Boyd G. Holbrook, M.D., Chairman of the panel, 
appeared at the hearing of September · 4, 1962, was 
sworn and testified as a witness. (R. 31-40). He did 
not so testify. The only suggestion of disability result-
ing from the industrial injuries appears in the con-
clusion of Dr. Burke M. Snow, who examined Pintar 
on October 17, 1961, approximately three and one.:half 
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months prior to the examination of Pintar by the 
Medical Panel on February 5, 1962. The conclusions 
of Dr. Snow were set forth on the last page of his report 
(R. 4) as follows: 
"CONCLUSIONS: From the available his-
tory given by the patient it seems that the only 
conclusion one can come to is that this patient 
received an aggravation of a previously existing 
degeneration process in the lumbar spine. The 
conditions were present and he had been working 
daily and on a regular basis with no back com-
plaints prior to his injury. The rib complaints 
certainly are industrial." 
Dr. Snow did not testify and his report being hear-
say although admissible in evidence, is not competent 
evidence upon which an award may be based. Hackford 
v. Industrial Commission, 11 Utah 2d, 312, 358 P.2d 
899. 
Appellant cites on page 6 of his brief what he sets 
out as a quotation from the case of Utah-Idaho Cent. 
R. Co. v. Industrial Commission, 71 Utah 490, 267 P. 
785. We cannot find this quotation in the case. We 
assume that it is a quotation from some text which 
cites the case in support thereof. The case cited does 
not decide exactly as indicated by the quotation. It 
does, however, hold "A latent disease or trouble, if 
accelerated or lighted up by an industrial accident and 
a more serious injury results by reason of the fact of 
the existence of such latent ailment than otherwise 
would in a normal recovery from injuries received 
from or in an accident, in such case the injured employee 
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is entitled to additional compensation." (PP. 787 and 
788 of 267 P). The case did not hold, however, that the 
Industrial Commission might make an award without 
substantial evidence. In the case, the Commission made 
a finding that the employee had 50lfo disability based 
upon a report of a medical board and the testimony 
of doctors at the hearing. The Supreme Court stated 
on page 787 of 267 P: 
"The report of the medical board quoted is 
some evidence that applicant has sustained per-
manent partial disability. The report of Dr. 
Baldwin, quoted, also recognizes that applicant 
has suffered some disability. The commission is 
the fact-finding body. If there is any substantial 
evidence to support its findings, such findings 
are conclusive upon this court." 
The only question involved in the cited case was 
if the finding of the Commission was supported by any 
substantial testimony. 
We have no quarrel with the decision and submit 
it in support of respondents' contention that the finding 
of the Commission in the case now before the court 
should not be disturbed. 
POINT 2 
The Commission could not have made an award 
based only upon the report of Dr. Burke M. Snow and 
did not act arbitrarily and capriciously in not adopting 
his conclusions. 
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The quotation set out on page 7 of appellant's 
brief as being a statement of the Supreme Court of 
Utah in the case of Gunnison Sugar Co. v. Industrial 
Commission_, 73 Utah 535, 275 P .777, cannot be found 
by us. 
The case cited is entirely different from "the present 
case before the court. There is nothing in the record in 
the present case which indicates that the employer was 
not furnishing medical care for the injured employee. 
In the Gunnision Sugar Co. case, the employer acqui-
esced in the employee seeking medical attention from 
doctors of his choice and the court decided only that 
in that situation the employee was entitled to recover 
compensation for the extracation of his teeth, upon 
the recommendation of a doctor who the injured em-
ployee consulted, because he would have been so entitled 
if the employer had furnished or selected the doctor. 
The Commission, upon recommendation of the 
Referee, adopted the report of the medical panel. (R. 
45-46). The medical panel had before it the report of 
Dr. Snow and attached it to its report and quoted from 
it. (R. 25). The report of Dr. Snow was, therefore, not 
ignored. The Commission was not required to accept 
the conclusions of Dr. Snow. It could not make an 
award based only thereon without other substantial 
evidence upon which it could make a finding in favor of 
applicant's contention. Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial 
Commission_, 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376. 
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POINT 3 
The order of the Industrial Commission not requir-
ing employer to pay doctor bills incurred by employee 
for examination by doctors of his own choice consulted 
without permission of employer or order of the Com-
mission is not contrary to law and is not contrary to the 
facts of the case. 
This point apparently involves the refusal of the 
employer to pay _$55.00 for X-Rays taken by Donald 
K. Bailey, M.D., which were apparently taken at the 
suggestion of Dr. Snow. (R. 21, 22 and 23). The Com-
mission did not require the employer to pay. After the 
question of payment of this expen~e and the cost of 
a corset were brought up at the hearing of September 4, 
1962, the employer agreed to pay the cost of the corset 
and so advised the Referee of the Industrial Commis-
sion by letter dated September 7, 1962. (R. 44). On 
this letter, Commissioner Wiesley apparently called 
to the attention of the Referee Rule 10 of the Industrial 
Commission that the employer has choice of M.D. and 
that charge cannot be made against employer for ex-
pense of another doctor without permission of the Com-
rmsswn. 
To support appellant's contention, he cites the case 
of Marl-cer v. Industrial Commission_, 84 Utah 587, 37 
P .2d 785. Like the other quotations in appellant's brief, 
we cannot find in the books cited the quotation. The 
case cited was one in which payment was required to 
be made to employee, not by employer, but out of a 
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special fund provided by R. S. Utah 1933, Sec. 42-1-62, 
wherein it was provided that where an employee pre-
viously injured and suffering permanent and complete 
loss of use of part of his body who is subsequently in-
jured in the course of his employment would receive 
from his employer or its insurance carrier an award 
for the last injury and in addition thereto, might get 
some additional benefits payable from the special fund 
but not from the employer or its insurance carrier. 
The case does not support the statement by appel-
lant on page 8 of his brief, "Therefore, if an employee 
already had only one eye or leg or hand, the employer 
becomes liable for total disability upon the loss of the 
remaining eye, or leg or hand." The cited case is not in 
point on the problem under consideration 
We submit that the record in this case does not 
support a requirement for the employer to pay for the 
services of a doctor selected by employee to make the 
examination of him, not consented to by the employer 
or ordered by the Commission. 
POINT 4 
Although the report of Dr. Burke M. Snow is 
competent and admissible evidence~ the Commission did 
not act arbitrarily and capriciously in adopting the re-
port of the medical panel. 
Like the other quotations, we cannot find in the 
books cited the quote appearing on page 8 of appellant's 
9 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
brief, although the case of Hackford v. Industrial Com-
mission~ 11 Utah 2d 312, 358 P.2d 899, is authority for 
the proposition that a physician's report might properly 
be received in evidence even though it is hearsay. 
This does not require the Commission to make a 
finding in favor of appellant based upon the report of 
Dr. Snow. In the Hackford case, the Supreme Court 
set aside an award of the Industrial Commission where 
the medical panel had made a report which had been 
objected to by the applicant and where no testimony 
was given by any member of the panel and where an-
other doctor had made a report but did not testify. A 
report alone is not sufficient to sustain an award unless 
it is the report of the medical panel to which no objection 
is made. 
"This Court has uniformly held that hearsay testi-
mony is admissible, but just as uniformly held that a 
finding of fact cannot be based solely upon hearsay 
evidence." Ogden Iron Works v. Industrial Commis-
sion~ 102 Utah 492, 132 P.2d 376 at page 380. 
In the case of Burton v. Industrial Commission, 
13 Utah 2d 353, 374 P.2d 439, this court decided that 
it was not capricious, arbitrary or unreasonable for the 
Commission to accept the medical panel's report and 
testimony of the members of the medical panel even 
though there was evidence contrary thereto. 
"Assuming without deciding that the plaintiff's 
evidence if uncontradicted would be sufficient 
10 
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to sustain a finding in her favor, it is indisputable 
that the testimony just referred to is sufficient 
to sustain a finding to the contrary. There being 
no basis upon which this court could say that the 
Commission acted capriciously, arbitrarily or un-
reasonably in denying the application, its order is 
affirmed." ( P. 440 of 37 4 P .2d) . 
POINT 5 
The Industrial Commission may adopt the findings 
of a medical panel supported by testimony of a member 
thereof. 
Although we do not disagree with Point 5 as stated 
by appellant, we do not infer that the Commission 
must reject the findings of the medical panel supported 
by testimony and adopt findings contrary thereto based 
upon other substantial conflicting evidence which sup-
ports a contrary finding. By this statement, we do not 
admit that in this case there is any conflicting substantial 
non hearsay evidence contrary to the findings of the 
medical panel upon which the Commission made its 
finding. 
CONCLUSION 
The decision of the Industrial Commission should 
be affirmed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
11 
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